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In this paper I argue that Husserl’s characterization of evidence as fulfilled 
intention is best understood in terms of the most fundamental mode in which we 
experience such fulfillment: the expression of the ‘I can’ through the responsivity of the 
lived body. Despite his early tendency to understand fulfillment primarily in terms of 
linguistic or logical meaning-identity, it is my contention that Husserl’s later work should 
be viewed as increasingly characterizing the core meaning of fulfillment in terms of 
practical agency accomplishing its intentionality through the body that enacts and confirms 
that intentionality – though it is far from clear that Husserl himself recognized this 
direction in which his own phenomenological analyses were leading him. The central 
meaning of fulfillment, I will argue, is realized intentionality – and on the most basic level 
the unity of intention and realization is experienced in the practical ‘holding sway’ of the 
ego in the lived body. Thus the unity of self qua ego and self qua lived body that occurs in 
practical agency involves a pre-thematic experience of identity between intention and its 
fulfilling intuition – an identity that serves as the basis for all higher-order fulfillment 
experiences.  The empty/fulfilled structure has its genetic and transcendental ‘origin’ in 
embodiment and its various levels of agential satisfaction or dissatisfaction.1 As a result, 
the experience of ego-Leib unity underwrites our practical understanding of all other 
experiences of fulfillment. 
                                                 
1
 I am grateful to Steven Crowell for this formulation. 
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Though Husserl himself did not explicitly make or endorse this thesis, I will argue 
here that it is both consistent with his position and more phenomenologically compelling 
than the dominant Husserlian view, which locates the meaning of fulfillment in isolated 
acts of perception. Though the foundational role of embodied praxis is more closely 
associated with Husserl-inspired thinkers such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, I will 
argue that it is already a latent presence in Husserl’s own work – a presence that makes 
itself known not only in his increasing emphasis on the complexity of the living body qua 
practical agent, but even in the metaphors that Husserl uses to describe the experience of 
fulfillment itself. 
 
Fulfillment 
What is fulfillment, and how do we recognize it as such? In the Logical 
Investigations Husserl characterizes the relationship between meaning-intending and 
meaning-fulfilling acts as a type of coinciding unity (Deckungseinheit)2. This unity is 
experienced as such when the meaning intention is fulfilled, when it becomes “saturated 
with the fullness of exemplary intuition” (Introduction, §4, 173). The notion of fulfillment 
is the foundation of Husserl’s epistemology, since fulfillment experiences serve as the 
Evidenz in terms of which phenomenological analysis can make a claim to truth with any 
legitimacy. Ideas I makes this clear: “Immediate ‘seeing,’ not merely sensuous, 
experiential seeing, but seeing in the universal sense as an originally presentive 
                                                 
2
 Husserl, Edmund. Logical Investigations. Trans. J.N. Findlay, Ed. Dermot Moran (New York: Routledge, 
2001, VI, §6, 209). References to the Investigations will be to this edition and identified parenthetically in the 
text by “LI” followed by the investigation number, the section number and the page number from this 
translation. 
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consciousness of any kind whatever, is the ultimate legitimizing source of all rational 
assertions.”3 
How are we to understand this ‘immediate seeing’ that is originally presentive of 
the things themselves? Husserl describes this experience of the intentional object’s 
givenness to experience as: “‘itself there’, ‘immediately intuited’, ‘given originaliter.’ For 
the Ego that signifies: not aiming confusedly at something, with an empty expectant 
intention, but being with it itself, viewing, seeing, having insight into, it itself.”4 Husserl 
believes there are many different types of such fulfillment experiences or “originally 
presentive intuitions” – be they spatio-temporal objects encountered in experiences of 
fulfilled perceptual intentionality, or ideal objects given in the fulfillment experiences 
corresponding to higher-order modes of intentionality. Because of this plurality of modes 
of fulfillment, one is lead to question the nature of their unity. What makes them all 
instances of fulfillment? What is the most basic stratum of meaning in terms of which this 
diversity of fulfillment types can all be understood as instances of fulfillment as such? In 
other words, in order to understand this kind of fulfillment relationship, we must engage in 
a phenomenological analysis of fulfillment itself, uncovering the most basic sense of the 
meaning of such fulfilling ‘saturation.’ How is the experience of fulfillment – the first-
person experience of the unity of intention with saturating exemplary intuition – 
                                                 
3
 Husserl, Edmund. (1998) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy: First Book. Trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers). Section 44, pp. 36/36. 
Henceforth referenced parenthetically in the text as Ideas I, with original German pagination listed first, 
followed by the English translation. 
4
 Husserl, Edmund (1999) Cartesian Meditations. Trans. Dorion Cairns. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, pp. 92-93/57. Henceforth referenced parenthetically in the text as CM, with original German 
pagination listed first, followed by the English translation. 
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recognized as such? Further, how do we even investigate this problem when such events of 
fulfilling recognition are necessary for the investigation itself to proceed? 
 The argument of this paper is that the experience of the ego’s holding sway over its 
own living body serves a foundational role in the meaning of fulfillment – a role, as we 
will see, that helps explain Husserl’s consistent use metaphors of embodiment in his efforts 
to explain what he means by fulfillment.5 
To speak of self-evidence, of self-evident givenness, then, here signifies nothing 
other than self-givenness, the way in which an object in its givenness can be 
characterized relative to consciousness as ‘itself-there,’ ‘there in the flesh,’ in 
contrast to its mere presentification [Vergegenwärtigung], the empty, merely 
indicative idea of it (EJ 19). 
 
All instances of fulfillment implicitly refer back to this primal form of fulfillment in the 
givenness of the self to itself ‘in the flesh’ of embodied agency. Self-evidence and 
apodictic insight are themselves to be understood as idealized forms of this more 
fundamental experience of self-givenness – something being experienced as there ‘in 
person.’ 
There are a number of different ways in which such a foundational role for 
embodiment could be understood: 
                                                 
5
 For example, see Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, where he describes complete self-
givnness as “complete givenness in the flesh.” Husserl, Edmund. Analyses Concerning Passive and Active 
Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic. Trans. Anthony J. Steinbock. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001, 293/579. Henceforth referenced as PAS, with the German pagination listed first, followed 
by the page of this English translation. In Experience and Judgment, Husserl talks of how the givenness “in 
person [Leibhaft]” of a conflicting perceptual appearance can create doubt (Husserl, Edmund. Experience 
and Judgment. Ed. Ludwig Landgrebe. Trans. James Churchill and Karl Ameriks. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973, p. 93. Future references will be to this edition and identified parenthetically in the 
text by “EJ” followed by the page number. In Ideas I, originarily presentive consciousness is characterized as 
a ‘grasping’ the fulfillment of the sense: “Focusing on the noema we find, fused with the pure sense, the 
characteristic ‘in person’ (as originary fulfilledness)” (Ideas I §136, 282-283). 
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a.) As a normative foundation in the sense of an ideal standard against which all other 
acts of fulfillment are assessed for their degree of perfection. 
b.) As a constitutive foundation, serving as the blueprint for the ego’s intentional 
achievements and, as such, constitutive of the basic meaning of fulfillment. 
c.) As the abstractive foundation or origin of our concept of ‘fulfillment’6 
My claim here is that the ego-Leib unity of the lived body is best understood as 
foundational in the sense of b.). It is not my intent to argue for c.) since it is clear that for 
Husserl, any number of experiences of a particular type could serve as the abstractive 
foundation of the concept designating that type. Thus the abstractive origin of someone’s 
concept of fulfillment could be any specific example of fulfillment that is available if and 
when the agent decides to engage in the higher-order act of abstracting. What we are 
concerned to show here, rather, is that the ability to recognize higher-order instances as 
fulfillment presupposes a pre-conceptual familiarity with basic experiences of fulfillment – 
experiences which set the terms for what counts as such in our everyday pre-theoretical 
grasping of intentions as fulfilled. 
How, then, should we understand the notion of a ‘constitutive foundation’ and the 
way in which ego-Leib unity play this role? By a ‘constitutive foundation’ I understand a 
core element of a complex meaning on which other aspects of that meaning depend – in 
this case, the meaning is intention-fulfillment and the core element is the ego-Leib unity in 
which practical agency is ongoingly realized. The argument of this paper will be that 
grasping the meaning of fulfillment as such depends on an implicit awareness of ourselves 
                                                 
6
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helping me clarify these three different interpretations of what 
such a foundational role could involve. 
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as agents who form intentions that may or may not be realized in the world. Fulfillment is 
about intentionality, and intentionality is fundamentally a feature of practical agency – it is 
an orientation toward the world in which expectations are set up and then realized. In and 
through specific moments of fulfillment, there is an on-going implicit confirmation or 
realization of oneself as a successful practical agency. Thus the most basic sense of 
coinciding unity grounding the meaning of fulfillment as such is the experienced identity 
of different facets of our agency: the intending ego and the embodied agency that realizes 
or fulfils that intending. 
Perfect fulfillment would be experienced as such when one’s actions perfectly 
manifested one’s practical striving; where intention and enactment are so perfectly fitted 
that there is no gap in one’s experience. Because it does not always display this perfection 
of fit or coinciding unity, ego-Leib unity is unable to fully serve the normative 
foundational role staked out in a.) – which is better captured by ideal instances of perfect 
fulfillment as found in, say, math or logic. Thus a.) specifies the ideal of perfect fulfillment 
against which particular instances of fulfilled intention are assessed for the degree of 
fulfillment that they display. Husserl expresses this idea in Cartesian Meditations as 
follows: “Perfect evidence and its correlate, pure and genuine truth, are given as ideas 
lodged in the striving for knowledge, for fulfillment of one’s meaning intention” (CM 
52/12). He acknowledges there that “the question whether adequate evidence does not 
necessarily lie at infinity may be left open” (CM 55/15). The characterization of fulfillment 
as a condition that can obtain in degrees, however, indicates that while the ideal of perfect 
fulfillment is in some sense constitutive of the basic meaning of fulfillment itself, it only 
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functions as such against a background understanding of fulfillment as a continuum or 
range of possible unity. The ideal of perfect fulfillment is an abstraction derived from the 
more basic meaning of fulfillment understood in terms of degrees of coinciding givenness 
(LI VI, §39, 263). As we will see below, the unification of ego and Leib in the expressive 
manifestation of agency comes in degrees in this way. Thus the baseline of unity 
constitutive of embodied agency sets the terms for understanding fulfillment itself, but it is 
only when there is a perfect fit between ego and expressive body that we could also see 
this unity serving as a pre-theoretical standard for fully adequate evidence. 
Though there will be degrees of fit evident in such embodied fulfillment, then, the 
experience that it designates is so foundational to the meaning of intentional agency that it 
establishes the terms in which fulfillment is understood in the most basic way. Despite the 
fact that there will be different modes of fulfillment for different types of intentional 
object, the unified fulfillment experienced in the ego holding sway over the body gives 
fulfillment itself its very sense – namely, that of an intention being realized. Thus the ego-
Leib fulfillment experience serves as a pre-theoretical constitutive foundation of the 
meaning of fulfillment itself. 
 
Perception 
In contrast to this suggestion, one might be tempted to take perception as the 
paradigm for understanding the meaning of fulfillment, since perception seems to display 
the relevant relationship between empty intention and fulfilling intuition in a clear and 
basic way. For example, I expect to find coffee in my mug and when I look in the cup the 
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immediate givenness of the coffee to my perception fills my hitherto empty orientation to 
the object. Such examples reveal the phenomenal unity of intention and intuition essential 
to the notion of fulfillment, and, one might claim, do so with greater accuracy.  
Experience and Judgment seems to support this prioritization of perception.7 There 
Husserl notes that the ideal of fulfillment or self-evidence has never been adequately 
addressed; it has, for the most part, simply been assumed. Nevertheless it too requires a 
justification: 
[P]roblems of self-evidence, which supply the natural point of departure of every 
regressive subjective questioning concerning logical structures, have, in the 
tradition, never been seriously understood and examined at all as such.  Men 
believed that they knew in advance what self-evidence is. They believed that they 
could measure every other item of cognition against ideal, absolute, apodictically 
certain knowledge. They did not suspect that this ideal of knowledge (and with it 
the cognitions of the logician, which imply a claim of apodicticity for themselves) 
could for its part also require a justification and originary foundation (EJ 18). 
 
What is the justification and originary foundation for the ideal of knowledge? It seems that 
it might be best understood in terms of perception: though self-evidence has different 
modes of object-givenness, it is ultimately a type of self-giving immediacy that Husserl 
consistently describes in terms of perceivable physical presence. Thus Husserl notes in 
Formal and Transcendental Logic that “all truth and all judicative evidence, so we see, are 
related back to the primitive basis, experience”8. Experience, for Husserl, ultimately means 
a direct relation to an individual sensuous object (EJ 27). In order to arrive at the primitive 
                                                 
7
 This is not to suggest that Husserl does not prioritize perception elsewhere. E.g. “Perception is the 
primordial mode of intuitiveness” (PAS 69/110). Mary Rawlinson argues that for Husserl perception – and 
more specifically vision – acts as the model on which truth qua fulfillment is understood: “Perspectives and 
Horizons: Husserl on Seeing the Truth” in Sites of Vision. Levin, David Michael (ed). Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1997, pp. 265-292. 
8
 Husserl, Edmund. (1969) Formal and Transcendental Logic. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, p. 211. Future references will be to this edition and identified parenthetically in the text by 
FTL, followed by the page number. 
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basis of self-givenness, the objects of judgment must be absolutely “ultimate substrates” 
(EJ 26) – in other words, they can in no way have been generalized or subsumed to a 
category. The consequence of this is that “every thinkable judgment ultimately refers to 
individual objects” (EJ 26). The pre-predicative self-givenness of individual perceptual 
objects is therefore the first element of any theory of judgment (EJ 27). Though the 
purpose of judgment is to achieve the higher level of ‘once and for all’ confirmations 
[Feststellungen] of the object’s identity and its ‘how and what,’ such confirmations are 
always grounded on the immediacy of fulfillment accomplished at the level of the 
sensuous givenness of particulars: “…the structures of perception are taken into 
consideration only to the extent that it is necessary to understand how, on the basis of 
sensuous perceptive experience, logical operations, with their resulting logical formations, 
are established” (EJ 68). The higher order objects of judgment are thus “founded 
objectivities.”9 They are founded on primal intentional objects – i.e. perceptual noemata or 
sense-objects that are graspable in the most direct way. 
Such claims would seem to put perception in a good position for understanding it 
as the key to the meaning of fulfillment. However, when Husserl speaks of the sensuous 
perceptual experience of individual objects as being foundational for the logical, he notes 
that “At the point at which our analyses begin, various constitutive strata and operations 
are therefore presupposed” (EJ 68, emphasis mine). These presuppositions include a field 
of spatial things, kinesthetic strata, and temporality. These are all “dimensions of 
                                                 
9
 Husserl, Edmund. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: 
Second Book. Trans. F. Kersten. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, p. 17/19. Henceforth 
referenced parenthetically in the text as Ideas II, with German pagination listed first, followed by the 
pagination from this translation. 
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constitutive investigation which lie still deeper than those conducted here and which can 
only be alluded to at this time” (EJ 68). In other words, Experience and Judgment’s 
attempt to investigate the foundation of the ideal of fulfillment stops short of the 
constitutive strata that are, I believe, central for understanding it. These dimensions of 
investigation that ‘lie deeper still’ are what must ultimately cause us to be unsatisfied with 
Husserl’s claims that perception is the most primal form of fulfilling presence, since 
perception is only possible against the background of a more primordial form of unity – 
that of the ego-expressing body engaged in the act of perception. Perception comes late in 
the game, so to speak, since all specific events of perception depend on and are secondary 
to the unity of the perceiving body. The ongoingly confirmed status of the body as unified 
organ of perception demonstrates a pre-theoretical mode of self-givenness prior to and as a 
condition for particular perceptions. By examining this point in greater detail, we will be in 
a position to turn to the mode of confirmation characteristic of ego-Leib unity and show 
how it provides a constitutive foundation for understanding the fulfillment experience 
found in perception. Despite the tendency to grant perception the foundational role in the 
meaning of fulfillment, then, perception’s dependency on accomplishments of the living 
body requires us to re-think this tendency and recognize, instead, that the fulfillment 
accomplished in the body’s ego expressiveness is more basic than that experienced in 
individual acts of perception. 
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The Living Body 
By addressing these constitutive dimensions that lie ‘deeper still’ than even 
Experience and Judgment’s ultimate substrates of judgment, it will become apparent that 
modeling the fulfillment relationship on perception is only a first step toward 
understanding its more fundamental grounding on embodied experience. Husserl 
recognized that one cannot understand perception without recognizing the complex and 
dynamic role of the perceiving body. As he begins to realize in Ideas II, it is the living 
body that must be taken as the ‘ultimate substrate’ of experience, the first ‘individual 
object’ in terms of which all other objects are perceived: 
 
…the ego’s active functioning of the living body or the bodily organs, belongs in a 
fundamental, essential way to all experience of bodies….In a quite unique way the 
living body is constantly in the perceptual field immediately, with a completely 
unique ontic meaning….[as that] in which  I hold sway quite immediately.10 
 
Note his emphasis on ‘immediacy’ in all of his characterizations of ‘holding sway’ – an 
emphasis that demonstrates the distinction on this level between Leib and Körper. The 
former refers to the body as the worldly manifestation of one’s agency – the living body – 
while the latter refers to the body understood as a spatio-temporal object. Husserl is clear 
that fully constituting the body as a spatially and temporally objective thing requires the 
presence of other embodied knowers.11 But understood as living organ of will, it is the 
expressive Body – not another object in the perceptual field – that serves as the primordial 
and immediate ‘object’ of experience in a “quite unique way.” Perceptual objects – 
                                                 
10
 Husserl, Edmund. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction 
to Phenomenological Philosophy. Ed. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 107. 
Henceforth referenced in the text as Crisis, followed by the pagination from this translation. 
11
 See, for example, Ideas II, pp. 166-167/175 and 242/254. 
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including my own body qua Körper – are secondary to the ‘holding sway’ of the living 
body, which provides the perceptual terrain in terms of which specific perceptual objects 
can appear. 
 This perceptual terrain is accomplished by several essential features that distinguish 
the living body from all other objects. First, the body is a bearer of localized fields of 
sensations constitutive of a kind of irrefutable self-presence of the body to itself. Through 
kinaesthetic self-awareness and the sense of touch, I am given to myself as body. In 
touching my hand I find that there is a “series of touch-sensations, which are ‘localized’ in 
it” (Ideas II, 145/152). Unlike vision – in which one can in a sense forget oneself – touch 
binds me to the body and makes me present to myself as body. Husserl suggests that the 
localization of touch is constitutive of the first-person self-immediacy of the body that is 
not found in vision. “What I call the seen Body is not something seeing which is seen, the 
way my Body as touched Body is something touching which is touched” (Ideas II, 
148/155). If I only had vision “it would only be as if the Ego, in unity with this freedom in 
the kinaesthetic, could immediately and freely move the material thing, Body.” (Ideas II, 
150/158). In contrast, through the immediate givenness of self to self constituted in touch, 
the body’s unique status as living is accomplished.12 
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 In “The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty,” (Philosophical Topics, Vol. 27 (1999): 205-226). Taylor 
Carman takes this to be indicative of the fundamental flaw that makes Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
embodiment superior to Husserl’s; namely, that Husserl presents an overly mentalistic account in which there 
is a transcendental self prior to and independent of the body that is only recognized as ‘its’ through the act of 
identification accomplished through touch. Carman argues that this is evident in Husserl’s claim that it is 
only through touch that “Body as such can be constituted originarily” (Ideas II, pg. 158). But it is important 
to remember that this discussion occurs in §35 of Ideas II, where Husserl is considering the question of “the 
constitution of man as he presents himself to a naturalistic point of view: as material body upon which are 
constructed new strata of being” (Ideas II, 143/151). In other words, Husserl is not suggesting that this is the 
only or most essential dimension in terms of which bodily intentionality is first-personally manifest. Rather, 
when starting with a naturalistic conception of our own bodies it is through the sense of touch that we 
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The touch-sensing is not a state of the material thing, hand, but is precisely the hand 
itself, which for us is more than a material thing, and the way in which it is mine entails 
that I, the ‘subject of the Body,’ can say that what belongs to the material thing is its, 
not mine…On this surface of the hand I sense the sensations of touch, etc. And it is 
precisely thereby that this surface manifests itself immediately as my Body (Ideas II, 
150/157). 
 
The body is also the ‘zero point’ of my orientation toward the world – another essential 
feature for understanding the possibility of perception. The body is “the bearer of the here 
and now, out of which the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world of the senses. Thus 
each thing that appears has eo ipso an orienting relation to the Body, and this refers not 
only to what actually appears but to each thing that is supposed to be able to appear” (Ideas 
II, 56/61). All of my experiences are ‘oriented’ in terms of this bodily place from which I 
perceive the world. I understand spatial relationships like left/right, up/down, near/far in 
terms of their placement in relation to my body: “I have all things over and against me; 
they are all ‘there’ – with the exception of one and only one, namely the Body, which is 
always ‘here’” (Ideas II, 159/166). Perception’s intrinsically perspectival mode of 
givenness rests on the oriented nature of the body and the perceptual terrain that it opens 
up. 
Finally, perception depends on the body understood as the unique vehicle of the 
will insofar as perception is essentially and irrevocably mobile. We experience spatio-
temporal objects as having a horizon of possible future profiles because of the possibility 
                                                                                                                                                    
become aware of the failures of that attitude in capturing the nature of the human body: once I include touch 
sensations, Husserl says, “then it is not that the physical thing is now richer, but instead it becomes Body 
[Leib], it senses” (Ideas II, 145/152). None of this rules out Husserl’s recognition that from the personalistic 
attitude – which has priority – the body is always already non-thematically present to me as the manifestation 
of my agency. To keep this discussion within manageable limits, I am bracketing the question here whether 
Merleau-Ponty did a better job of recognizing this point than Husserl himself did. For further discussion of 
these issues, see Crowell, Steven “The Normative in Perception,” in Normativity and Phenomenology in 
Husserl and Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 124-146. 
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of getting closer and grasping; a possibility that is dependent on the ego successfully 
holding sway over the body such that it is the effective vehicle of its striving. The active 
agency of the body accomplishing the ego’s intentional orientation is a necessary condition 
of the elements constitutive of any particular perception. Moving one’s eyes this way or 
that is necessary to gather visual data, applying pressure on something allows one to assess 
its resistance, etc. Husserl regularly discusses the necessary if/then relationship between 
bodily movement and the possible series of sensations that it will open up.13 
We constantly find here this two-fold articulation: kinaesthetic sensations on the 
one side, the motivating; and the sensations of features on the other, the 
motivated…Perception is without exception a unitary accomplishment which arises 
essentially out of the playing together of two correlatively related functions (Ideas 
II, 58/63). 
 
Thus the perceptual terrain is accomplished in the holding sway that manifests the 
responsiveness of the living body to the ‘I can’ of agency. The very possibility of 
perception depends on the body successfully serving as the unique vehicle of the ego’s 
striving: 
…in all perception and perceptual exhibition (experience) the Body is involved as 
freely moved sense organ, as freely moved totality of sense organs, and hence there 
is also given the fact that, on this original foundation, all that is thingly-real in the 
surrounding world of the Ego has its relation to the Body (Ideas II, 56/61). 
 
                                                 
13
 For further discussion of perception qua dynamic and temporally extended correlation between perceptual 
systems and experienced objects, see Drummond, John, “On Seeing a Material Thing in Space: The Role of 
Kinaesthesis in Visual Perception” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Vol. 40, No. 1 (1979) pp. 
19-32); Pacheri, Elizabeth “Leibhaftigkeit and Representational Theories of Perception” (pp. 148-160) and 
Jean-Luc Petit “Constitution by Movement: Husserl in Light of Recent Neurobiological Findings” (pp. 220-
244) both in Naturalizing Phenomenology, Ed. Jean Petitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud and Jean-
Michel Roy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
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It is for these reasons that Husserl will claim that “For the person, the living body is the 
privileged object in the surrounding world, over which it holds sway immediately”14.  
Such claims about the immediacy of the connection between the intending agency 
and the body that enacts or fulfills that agency may complicate any attempt to understand 
all fulfillment experiences in terms of it. After all, one might object that despite its 
founding on the lived body, perception should continue to be taken as the appropriate 
model for understanding the fulfillment relationship, since fulfillment is standardly 
understood as a relationship between two distinct experiences - an empty or signitive 
experience that is then “fulfilled” by an intuitive (e.g. perceptual) experience that bears the 
same meaning-content as that being designated in the signitive experience. Both 
experiences reveal themselves to be presenting the same object, thereby providing the 
relationship of Deckungseinheit characteristic of fulfillment. And most importantly, in 
doing so, the givenness of the object in intuition confirms what the empty intention merely 
posits. In other words, what seems to be essential to fulfillment is that the one experience 
provides evidence for the legitimacy of the other. How can the ego-Leib unity play this 
kind of truth-making role – a role characteristic of perception and one that is taken to be 
essential to the meaning of fulfillment? Just because the unity of the lived body is a 
necessary condition for the fulfillment relationships found in perception does not allow us 
to conclude that this unity is itself a constitutive instance of such confirmatory fulfillment. 
                                                 
14
 Crisis, p. 323, Appendix III: “Natural Science and Humanistic Science.” The immediate givenness of the 
ego in the body is available only in one’s own case and can only be approximated in other relationships, a 
fact that plays a pivotal role in Meditation V of the Cartesian Meditations, where the ‘accessible 
inaccessibility’ definitive of the phenomenological meaning of the Other turns on the fact that the other’s 
body intimates or expresses the presence of another ‘I can’ that can never be directly experienced as such. 
For an examination of this point, see Tanja Staehler’s “What is the Question to Which Husserl’s Fifth 
Cartesian Meditation is the Answer?” Husserl Studies 24 (2008): 99-117. 
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 To answer this objection, we need to examine further the nature of the relationship 
between ego and Leib that is presupposed in perceptual acts. 
 
Expression 
Husserl regularly uses the concept of expression (Ausdruck) to capture the essence 
of this kind of ego-Leib unity.15 What does he mean by ‘expression,’ and how will it help 
us to understand the living body’s role in the meaning of fulfillment? 
Husserl’s early discussions of ‘expression’ in the Logical Investigations are 
focused exclusively on the linguistic meaning of expression. There expressions are 
presented as signs that instantiate a meaning-intention. In keeping with his characterization 
of the ideality of meaning, he argues that expressive speech acts cannot be broken down 
solely into the physical sign and the mental state of the person who uses it. The expression 
does not merely indicate a mental state but instantiates an ideal meaning and thereby 
establishes a relation to what is objective. When this objective something that is meant is 
actually present then the meaning-intention embodied in the expression is fulfilled. Thus 
an expression sets up conditions of possible fulfillment insofar as the meaning that it 
embodies is or is not realized. Such fulfillment occurs when the object is given in an act 
that becomes “fused with the meaning-conferring acts in the unity of knowledge or 
                                                 
15
 Ulrich Melle noted the extensive use of the concept of ‘expression’ in his paper entitled “Das Rätsel des 
Ausdrucks” (Paper presented at the Husserl-Archive Arbeitstag, November 2006, Catholic University, 
Leuven).  Melle discusses the degree to which Husserl uses metaphors of the body-soul relationship to 
characterize expression, but he does not pursue what I take to be the most important implications of this: 
“Ausdrücke sind Doppeleinheiten, in denen wir den Gedanken einen festeren, dauerhafteren und leichter 
verfügbaren Körper geben” (p. 16). Husserl also uses the notion of ‘externalization’ to capture this double 
aspect of the self: “The radical consideration of the world is the systematic and purely internal consideration 
of the subjectivity which ‘expresses [or ‘externalizes’] itself in the exterior” (Crisis 113). 
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fulfillment” (LI I, §9, 192). Thus an expression is a unity in which a physical form 
embodies a meaning that can then be fulfilled through an act of intuitive givenness. 
If we seek a foothold in pure description, the concrete phenomenon of the sense-
informed expression breaks up, on the one hand, into the physical phenomenon 
forming the physical side of the expression, and, on the other hand, into the acts 
which give it meaning and possibly also intuitive fullness, in which its relation to an 
expressed object is constituted. In virtue of such acts, the expression is more than a 
merely sounded word. It means something, and in so far as it means something, it 
relates to what is objective (LI I, §9, 191-2). 
 
When employed in communication with others, an expression “also functions as an 
indication” (LI I, §6, 188) – i.e. as a sign that intimates the speaker’s “sense-giving inner 
experience” (LI I, §7, 189) to one who does not have direct access to it.16 Qua 
communication, then, expressions are a type of external manifestation or incarnation of the 
‘internal’ meaning-intending. Expressions need not play this communicative (indicative) 
role, however: they may also occur in solitary life simply as the meaning-conferring act of 
making a sign that is infused with sense (LI I, §9, 192). The import of these claims for 
intersubjectivity will be examined in greater detail below, but it is important to note here 
that Husserl distinguishes between the speaker’s own experience of the expressive 
manifestation of her meaning intention and the hearer’s experience of this unity. The 
hearer, he argues, can only presume the correspondence between the speaker’s meaning 
intention and the sense-informed expression that embodies it – he cannot himself directly 
experience this unity. The speaker, in contrast, will “live in the understanding of a word” 
                                                 
16
 Husserl contrasts expression with indication in LI I, §5-7, 187-190. In “The Living Body as the Origin of 
Culture: What the Shift in Husserl’s Notion of ‘Expression’ Tells us About Cultural Objects” Husserl Studies 
(2009) 25:57–79, Molly Brigid Flynn characterizes the difference as follows: “The indicating thing and the 
indicated thing are phenomenally two, and, due to the apprehension of a real connection between them, we 
are led directly from belief in one to the belief in the other. In contrast, the expression and the expressed are 
phenomenally unified, and we are lead through one to the intention of the other by way of an act of meaning” 
(61-62). Thus while expression involves a prior unity, indication involves separateness. 
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(LI I, §8, 190) i.e. in the immediate experience of the sign as expressive of a meaning that 
she intends as such. This meaning-intending establishes the conditions for what will count 
as fulfillment of that meaning; namely, the intuitive givenness of the objectivity picked out 
by that meaning-saturated expression. 
 
Comprehensive Unities 
In Ideas II Husserl expands the notion of expression significantly; in the early work 
he reserves this term simply for the way that verbal expressions enact or embody a 
meaning, while in the later work the concept comes to characterize all instances of what he 
calls comprehensive unities: “the unity of the ‘expression’ and the ‘expressed’… belongs 
to the essence of all comprehensive unities” (Ideas II, 236/248). Comprehensive unities 
refer to all unities that have “as it were a sensuous Body for a spiritual meaning that is 
grasped by way of understanding” (Husserl, Ideas II, 320/333). This includes the bodies of 
others and cultural objects such as artworks. But Husserl argues that those comprehensive 
unities are in turn founded on a more primordial form of such unity: the unity of one’s own 
ego and Leib: “all such comprehensive unities refer back to the unity of Body and spirit in 
the ordinary and most proper sense” (Ideas II, supplements, 320/333). 
How are we to understand this suggestion that the relationship between ego and 
Leib serves as the exemplar for the unity of all comprehensive unities, and that these 
relationships can all be understood in terms of the idea of expression? If we are to take the 
early discussions of expression to be instructive for understanding this expanded sense of 
the term, it seems that Husserl is suggesting the following analogy: the living body is to the 
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expressive word as the ego is to the intended meaning embodied in that word. In other 
words, the living body is expressive insofar as it instantiates the intending ego, just as the 
word instantiates the meaning intended through it. On this reading, then, the intending ego 
is the meaning of the body in which it finds expression. 
If this is right, how does the notion of fulfillment relate to the comprehensive unity 
of ego and Leib? As we saw in the case of linguistic expression, the expressive word 
functions as a meaning-intention that is fulfilled when the object designated by that word is 
brought to intuitive givenness. As such, the expressive word essentially functions as an 
empty meaning intention that must be brought together with a separate fulfilling act in 
order for fulfillment to occur. This does not appear to be the case when it comes to 
comprehensive unities, however, since they manifest first and foremost as a whole in 
which the constitutive elements ongoingly confirm their mutual presence within that 
whole, and in doing so they do not point to a fulfilling condition outside of themselves. 
Rather, a single object is grasped as simultaneously manifesting both a bodily and a 
spiritual aspect. There are not two distinct experiences – one of the bodily and one of the 
spiritual aspect – followed by the recognition of their correspondence. Rather, the 
expressive whole ongoingly presents the continued unity of the elements comprising it. A 
single object or event is experienced as having two different but related aspects – aspects 
that are not experienced as separate but as facets of a single complex whole, just as the 
meaningful word is experienced simultaneously as physical sign and bearer of meaning. 
Though these different facets are present to varying degrees in many comprehensive 
unities (e.g. the other’s psyche can only ever be apperceived, not perceived in the way his 
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body can) – the unified whole nevertheless has priority and the aspects can only be 
separated through abstraction (Ideas II, 241/253).  
As a result, it seems that the nature of the unification of aspects found in expressive 
comprehensive unities makes it difficult to understand how an experience of ego-body 
Deckungseinheit could count as a genuine instance of fulfillment. After all, the one does 
not seem to provide evidence for the validity of the other, as is the case in supposedly 
paradigm instances of intention-fulfillment like perception, whereby the empty intention is 
confirmed by the subsequent intuition. Perception unifies fulfilling givenness with prior 
intention and thereby legitimates the latter. Why, then, should we take the expressive unity 
of body and spirit to be foundational for the meaning of the unity involved in fulfillment 
generally if it does not have this evidence structure? After all, the early account of 
expression only appears to explain how meaning intending is accomplished via incarnation 
in the expressive word. Even if the ‘reference back’ to the lived body is constitutive of 
comprehensive unities, why should we take this to be constitutive for understanding the 
legitimation structure of fulfillment itself? 
In answering this important objection, we must be sure not to allow the specific 
evidence structure of perception to color our understanding of what kinds of fulfillment 
might be possible. As he notes in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: “not 
every process of bringing to intuition, that is, not every fulfillment is confirming” (68/109). 
We can see why this might be so when we recall what Husserl says in Ideas I regarding the 
necessity of distinguishing between mental and physical experiences. In the latter case 
there is a necessary inadequacy built into all such perceptual experience: 
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Of necessity, a physical thing can only be given one-sidedly;’ and that signifies, not 
just incompletely or imperfectly in some sense or other, but precisely what 
presentation by adumbrations prescribes. A physical thing is necessarily given in 
mere ‘modes of appearance’ in which necessarily a core of ‘what is actually 
presented’ is apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of ‘co-givenness,’ 
which is not givenness proper, and of more or less vague indeterminateness” (Ideas 
I, 80/94). 
 
 
Because of the adumbrated quality of perceptual experience, there is necessarily a halo of 
absent but co-given dimensions surrounding the immediate presence of the fulfilling 
intuition. The perceptual object is given in an unfolding series of partial profiles that can 
never be completed. As such, perception can never entirely rule out skepticism. Thus 
perceptual fulfillment is necessarily understood in terms of legitimation procedures 
because it gradually reveals dimensions of a domain of experience that is irrevocably 
haunted by uncertainty and contingency. The structure of perception calls out for 
legitimation: 
 
It is of the essence of the physical world that no perception, however perfect, 
presents anything absolute in that realm; and essentially connected with this is the 
fact that any experience, however extensive, leaves open the possibility that what is 
given does not exist in spite of the continual consciousness of its own presence ‘in 
person.’ According to eidetic law it is the case that physical existence is never 
required as necessary by the givenness of something physical, but is always in a 
certain manner contingent. This means: It can always be that the further course of 
experience necessitates giving up what has already been posited with a legitimacy 
derived from experience (Ideas I, 86/102). 
 
 
Characterizing all fulfillment relationships in terms of the confirmation structure of 
perception, however, presupposes as universal the demand for existential evidence that is 
built in to the dubitability of our experience of perceptual objects. But the basic meaning of 
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the intention/fulfillment relationship must have such an evidence structure only if it is 
defined in advance as being perceptual in that way. Since Husserl indicates that there are 
multiple kinds of fulfillment, however, we might legitimately ask if the demand for 
evidence built into perception is indeed constitutive for understanding all fulfillment 
relationships. 
Despite such potential answers to the objection, there is nevertheless a sense in 
which the idea of confirmation seems intrinsic to the meaning of intention fulfillment. 
How are we to understand such confirmatory dimensions of the fulfillment experience if 
they are not understood in advance exclusively in terms of perceptual evidence – i.e. in 
terms of existence-confirmation cases where this existence is always open to doubt? 
If we return to our discussion of expression and comprehensive unities, it seems 
possible that though the fact of the relationship of the parts – the ego embodied in Leib as 
the tool of its agency – is not in question when we grasp the whole as such, we might 
nevertheless experience specific manifestations of that relationship as being more or less 
successful in expressing that whole. This will require us to clarify the nature of the 
meaning-bestowing intentionality that is operative in the ego-Leib relationship and what 
kind of fulfillment possibilities it establishes. Doing so will show us the way in which the 
analogy with linguistic expression ultimately fails, since the living body must be 
understood as both the expressive manifestation of the ego’s intentionality and the ongoing 
confirmatory fulfillment of that intentionality. In other words, the expressive word 
embodies a meaning whose confirmation or fulfillment comes from outside itself17, while 
                                                 
17
 Except, perhaps, in the case of linguistic expressions that are themselves manifestations of agency (e.g. “I 
promise”). 
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comprehensive unities involve an expressiveness that is in a sense self-fulfilling. The ego-
Leib whole – like the meaning-word whole – specifies a possibility of fulfillment, but in 
the former case that fulfillment is ongoingly occuring in the Leib’s successful expression 
of the ego’s intentionality as such. Though the ego-Leib unity is not a contingent or 
external unity in the same way that the unity of perceptual intuitions and intentions is, it 
nevertheless is more or less successful at manifesting or illustrating18 its unity within its 
specific actions. The living body is like a word that speaks on behalf of its own fittingness 
for expressing the meaning intention that it is attempting to express. Put otherwise, acts 
that manifest the coinciding unity of intending ego and expressive body will not serve as 
evidence for the existence of what is an on-going and irrefutable fact (i.e. that one is an 
embodied practical agent). Nevertheless, there is a sense in which experiences of this unity 
can play a kind of confirmatory or demonstrative role, illustrating the legitimacy of the 
connection between the intending ego and the body in which it comes to expression. 
 
Modes of Intentionality 
In order to understand how this can be, we must distinguish between two different 
modes of intentionality: that displayed in specific acts – reaching for the coffee, perceiving 
the apple – and that characterizing an agent’s overarching drive to grasp the world and 
recognize itself in that grasping.19 The latter is characterized by Husserl in terms of the pre-
                                                 
18
 Husserl uses both “confirming” and “illustrating” as stand-ins for the “logically basic relation of fulfulling” 
(LI I, §9, 192).  
19
 This general distinction is sometimes characterized as a distinction between intrinsic and derivative 
intentionality; the latter refers to particular intentional acts, while the former refers to the underlying mode of 
agency that makes this directedness toward things possible. For a discussion of the intrinsic/derivative 
debate, see John Haugeland’s “Understanding: Dennett and Searle” in his Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 291-304.. 
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theoretical striving for knowledge. This intentional orientation should not be understood as 
a deliberate position-taking on the part of the ego cogito, however, but as a general 
orientation of its agency itself:  
 
Striving after knowledge in the very broadest sense is precisely a striving directed 
toward being itself, and already belonging here is the most primitive presenting that 
has the structure of aiming-at. To be sure, we must not take this striving as an 
isolated intending, but rather, if we want to have the normal concept of knowing in 
the logical sense, we must conceive of the epistemic striving in connection with a 
habitual consistency that does not break off and is not arrested in a single act” 
(PAS, 85/128-129).20 
 
On the most primal level the very possibility of perception depends on the body’s 
perceptual systems being harmonized and placed in the service of the ego’s pre-theoretical 
project of knowing the world. Thus the kind of fulfillment operating in distinct acts of 
                                                 
20
 Here one might object that this ‘intention’ to know the world better is simply intrinsic to intentionality 
rather than a practical ordering of the self toward the world, and this is why Husserl talks about it as an 
“instinct” towards clarifying our sense of objects and towards finding the truth. In other words, it does not 
involve an active intention of any sort but is simply present in other intentions. At times Husserl does indeed 
appear to be hesitant about definitively endorsing the practical view I am presenting here: “One cannot say 
without further ado that inherent in every consciousness is a striving, an intending toward its object to 
possess the self [of the object]” (PAS 85/128). Nevertheless, he appears to want to do so: “Still, it is certainly 
a general, essential possibility that every consciousness, no matter through what kind of motivation (we 
mentioned associative awakening in the passive states), takes on an orientation, and in this connection takes 
on the intending directedness toward the very self of being. At most, there is the possibility that every 
consciousness becomes a consciousness that intends being, that it become a striving after knowledge, an 
endeavouring meaning that is satiated in a synthesis of confirmation” (PAS 85/129). Husserl speaks of this in 
Experience and Judgment as “the striving which belongs to the essence of normal perception” – a striving 
that is not to be characterized as an explicit act of the will, but as a practical tendency toward more complete 
grasping (EJ 85). Despite Husserl’s initial hesitations, then, he appears to become increasingly comfortable 
with viewing this striving as a kind of pre-theoretical intentional orientation that underwrites but is different 
than all other specific intentions. Characterizing this kind of intentionality as an ‘instinct’ ignores the sense in 
which I experience myself as at stake in this striving – the way in which my agency is present to itself as a 
task that it can succeed or fail at manifesting. This being at stake in the success of my activities is what 
establishes that the success and failure conditions of specific intentions show up as such. Thus it is not 
enough to say that this striving to be a successful agent is reducible to all the local strivings of specific 
intentions, since that obscures the way that my struggle to be in the world well – the fact that it matters to me 
in a particular way – sets up the specific intentional strivings as having success conditions.  To develop this 
argument fully might require a Heidegger-style account of the self as at issue for itself in such a way that 
specific intentional orientations are experienced as normative. See, for example, Crowell 2013, “The 
Normative in Perception.” The key point here, however, is that both Husserl’s own texts and the phenomena 
themselves give us reason to adopt this as the best way to read Husserl’s account of intentional agency. I am 
grateful to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.  
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perception only has its meaning as fulfillment in light of the over-arching epistemic 
striving of the ego that succeeds or fails at expressing itself into a unified world 
experience. The perception of ‘hot coffee’, for example, can only serve as confirmation or 
evidence if my practical agency has already set up an expectation of the way perceptual 
horizons will continue to maintain and confirm my harmonious world experience.21  
Husserl discusses this point in Experience and Judgment, when he shows the 
manner in which practical agency involves a constant flow of confirmations that include a 
reference back to the agency of the ego-Leib unity that performs them: experience has 
“from the first an open, empty horizon of explications to carry out (in the ‘I can,’ ‘I can 
proceed,’ ‘get a closer look,’ ‘turn it around,’ and so on)” (EJ 38). The paradigm of “the 
body which confirms itself in the harmony of experience” (EJ 54) is not an external object 
that acts as an identity pole within the manifold of experience, but the living body of the 
practical knower whose embodied ‘I can’ – whose agency – is constantly confirming itself 
and its projects in the harmony of intentionally directed kinesthetic activity.22 In doing so, 
the ego-Leib structure establishes the first experiences of coinciding unity between 
intention and fulfillment in terms of which external objects can be constituted: “The Ego 
has the ‘faculty’ (the ‘I can’) to freely move this Body – i.e., the organ in which it is 
                                                 
21
 The formalization of this intrinsic striving for knowledge is evident in phenomenology’s commitment to 
self-responsibility and the ultimate grounding of its claims in first-person experiences of fulfilled intentions. 
For Husserl’s statement on the radicalness of phenomenology’s self-responsibility see especially CM §2-5 
and the Epilogue to Ideas II. 
22
 In keeping with this emphasis on the primacy of the living Body as field of responsiveness to the will’s 
holding sway, Bernard Pachoud argues in “The Teleological Dimension in Perceptual and Motor 
Intentionality” that Husserl’s insight into the essential motor dimension of all experience “requires us to see 
in movement, or in action, rather than in perception, the model on the basis of which to think intentionality” 
– not vice versa, as has been the trend”.  In (1999) Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary 
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Ed. Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela, Berhard Pachoud and Jean-
Michel Roy (Stanford: Stanford University Press): pp. 196-219, 217. 
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articulated – and to perceive an external world by means of it” (Ideas II, 152/159-160). 
Such movements are expressive of the ego’s ‘I can’ only insofar as they are intentionally 
articulated – they are not mere spasms but ordered manifestations of a practical 
intentionality expressing itself through the perceiving body: 
[T]he character of subjective movement, of the ‘I move’…from the very outset can 
be apprehended as something practically possible. Indeed, we have to say in 
general that only what has this subjective character admits apriori of such an 
apprehension. Originally, it is only here that the ‘I will’ emerges. Originally, it is 
here and only here that an imagined will can be affirmed and can become an actual 
willing (Ideas II, 259/271). 
 
What this point allows us to recognize, then, is that the basic meaning of fulfillment refers 
to the overarching practical intentionality of agency being fulfilled by its embodied acts, by 
the givenness of the body as the incarnation of that intentionality. The actual willing of 
embodied striving affirms the imagined willing of the ego, whose intention to know the 
world is ongoingly confirmed by the givenness of the body engaged in realizing that 
project.23 
As we noted above, all comprehensive unities of expression refer back to this most 
fundamental unity in which body expresses spirit – but we can now see that so too do the 
unities accomplished in perceptual fulfillment, since the latter only arise as moments in the 
on-going practical fulfillment of the knowing, embodied agent. Indeed, we must recognize 
                                                 
23
 One might object here that the living body is part of, rather than the fulfillment of, my intending. But if the 
intention at issue is the overarching project of being an efficacious agent in the world, then that intention is 
fulfilled insofar as the living body enacts that worldly efficaciousness. When considering the fulfillment of 
specific intentions to know or do this or that thing, however, it is the given thing itself that fulfills the 
intention. In such cases, the embodied agency grasping the object does indeed become part of the intending 
itself. Thus the living body plays more than one role in the intention/fulfillment relationship, depending on 
the type of intentionality that is at stake – intrinsic or derivative. The body can and does play both roles at 
once – it is both the vehicle and realization of my intentionality. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for 
bringing this objection to my attention. 
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that the meaning of the empty intentions to be fulfilled by perception only derive their 
signative content from the over-arching praxis of the agent who lives out the ‘I can’. Thus 
perceptual givenness would not count as evidence if there were no empty intentions set up 
by the practical movements of an embodied ego engaged in the project of successfully 
navigating the world. So the meaning identity operative in fulfilment – the identity of ego 
and Leib that founds practical agency – is only secondarily about specific meanings like 
‘coffee’ or ‘triangle’ – rather, those specific meaning intention/fulfilment unities function 
as such because my practical agency sets them up as intentions for me to have and thereby 
establishes what could count as fulfilling them. It is important to be careful, then, not to 
endorse a priority of perception that is only possible by artificially isolating perceptual 
events from the flow of the life in which they occur. The ability of specific perceptual acts 
to serve as knowledge-bearers is derivative of the more originary intention/fulfillment 
relationship that occurs when a practical agency confirms for itself the success of its 
intentional striving to know the world through a body that realizes that agency. 
 
Perception and Passive Synthesis 
One might be wont to object, however, that the most basic kinds of fulfillment 
don’t occur on the ‘practical’ level but are to be found, rather, in the passive syntheses of 
perception. For example, the grasping of hyletic sense data may be a more appropriate 
arena for understanding primordial fulfillment experiences, since such sense-data operate 
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on a stratum prior to active sense-constituting.24 Thus Husserl notes in Ideas II, supplement 
VI that: 
 
…sensations are subjective, but in quite a different way than acts are. I have 
sensations – it is in quite a different way that I carry out acts. The Corporeal body 
as bearer of sense-data ‘localized’ in it, as substrate of fields of sensation, is 
subjective in a metaphorical sense; but in addition it is a field of free movement 
(317/330). 
 
But note here that Husserl is referring to the Corporeal body – namely, body understood 
from within the naturalistic attitude as a particular kind of spatio-temporal object causally 
affected by sense data. Such a body is subjective only in a metaphorical sense – it is not 
lived as subjective; i.e. it is not the site or bearer of intentions that could or could not be 
fulfilled. Note also Husserl’s distinction between having and carrying out – the former 
indicating the manner in which the Corporeal body is viewed as receptor of sense data that 
only becomes my intentional object insofar as it is taken up in an active meaning-
intending. The active and personal self – the intentional self – is characterized by meaning-
constituting intentional relations to the world that cannot be accommodated by the 
passivity of sensation or the causal story on which it rests. Thus the genuine subjectivity of 
intentionality always presupposes a ‘carrying out’ – not a bare ‘having’ – and therefore 
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 In regard to this early approach to the issue to be found in Husserl’s work, Juan-José Botero notes that 
“…in a sense it is true that the hyletic moments prescribe the object. Yet they are not intentional by 
themselves. It is the noesis that necessarily informs the hyle and determines which object will be constituted. 
Accordingly, the objective noema is the outcome of the intentional unification through noetic Leistungen of a 
hyletic diversity. This is the sense in which it can be said that the object is ‘given’ by the hyletic data” (1999) 
“The Immediately Given as Ground and Background”. In Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in 
Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Ed. Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela, Bernard 
Pachoud and Jean-Michel Roy (Stanford: Stanford University Press) p. 448. As Steven Crowell points out, 
however, the later Husserl comes to abandon the view that sensations are not intentional objects but only 
become so through the interpretive Auffassung that makes them so. Husserl came to recognize that the 
problem with such a view is its inability to explain the universality and normativity belonging to perception 
as such (Crowell 2013, pp. 130-135). 
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implies the practical agency of epistemic striving and the embodied expression that makes 
carrying it out possible. 
Within the scope of this practical agency, however, we can distinguish between two 
different meanings of intentionality and its fulfillment: both the spontaneous, active 
verification of meaning intentions occurring in the ego cogito’s deliberate judgments, and 
the ‘passive’ confirmation that belongs to the perceptual sphere.25 It is important for us to 
complicate the active/passive dichotomy, however, by recognizing that this latter ‘passive’ 
form of perceptual intentionality is in fact quite active – though it is accomplished by an 
embodied activity occurring on a pre-thematic level. 26 Its activity consists in pointing 
forward toward the horizon of empty intentions through an ongoing confirmatory striving. 
As Husserl points out, we do not have the language to fully capture the sense in which the 
‘passive’ intentionality of embodied perceptual grasping is characterized by a kind of 
overarching active “teleological directedness” or “meantness.” (PAS 76/118). 
Nevertheless, he notes the importance of distinguishing between the intentional 
spontaneity of the active ego and the ‘passive’ intentionality “whereby the ego, and in a 
totally different sense, is the radiating point of directedness, of a directedness toward the 
object. For want of terms at our disposal, we avail ourselves of the apposition, ‘passive,’ 
passive intention” (PAS 76/118). 
Husserl characterizes the former, ‘active activity’ as being entirely dependent on 
the ‘passive activity’ of embodied perception. Thus he notes that: 
                                                 
25
 See Sections 16-18 of PAS. 
26
 For a reading of Husserl in terms of Dreyfus’ notion of “everyday coping” see Arp, Kristana “Husserlian 
Intentionality and Everyday Coping” in Issues in Husserl’s Ideas II (eds. Thomas Nenon & Lester Embree. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, pp. 161-171). 
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Perception has its own intentionality that as yet does not harbor anything of the 
active comportment of the ego and of its constitutive accomplishment. For the 
intentionality of perception is rather presupposed in order for the ego to have 
something for which or against which it can decide. (PAS, 54/94). 
 
 
This perceptual intentionality refers not only to such things as the unthematized 
movements of the eye constitutive of vision, but to the overarching commitment on the 
part of the perceiver to continue perceiving in a harmonious way. Though Husserl takes 
predicative judgment to be founded on the pre-theoretical grasping of ‘passively received’ 
perceptual objects, then, these perceptual objects are given in a “unity of experience” 
(Ideas II, 40/43) which is itself only possible against the background of the unity of the 
ego-saturated body striving to know. “The sense-things are what they are as unities ‘in’ a 
manifold of perceptions and kinesthetic constellations of subjectivity” (Ideas II, 65-66/70). 
Though perception is a precondition for judgment, perception is only possible as a result of 
a more primordial givenness – the self-givenness of the embodied, perceiving ‘I’ 
committed to the dynamic and ongoing project of knowing the world, and confirming for 
itself its success in carrying out this project through the responsivity of the lived body. 
Placing the kinaesthetic movements of the lived body on the side of pure passivity 
obscures the manner in which there is a kind of deliberate but unthematized intentionality 
running throughout all such perceptual movements – an intentionality that falls under the 
auspices of “a constant process of expanding knowledge” (PAS, 25/63); a “striving and 
actualizing intention” that is a “fundamental trait of all intentional life” (CM 93/57-58). 
Despite his tendency to speak of the pure passivity of the ego in perceptual receptivity, 
then, this sharp passive/active distinction is misleading. The condition for perception is the 
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body, and the perceiving body is not purely passive – it enacts its own animated condition 
(and the perceiving that this allows) in light of the ego’s drive for reliably unified 
experience. Thus the fact that all higher-order ego-orientations depend on perception – and 
perception depends on the lived body – means that the ego is ‘infected’ with its lived 
embodiment all the way down.27 
Any specific instance of perceptual fulfillment, then, is only possible in light of a 
prior practical commitment – a pre-theoretical ‘directedness’ on the part of the knower to 
finding greater knowledge and overcoming information conflicts: “running through passive 
life are ever newly interweaving syntheses of fulfillment. A continual striving after 
intuition that realizes the meant self, a continual – we couldn’t help thinking of the term – 
confirmation” (PAS, 102/146). 
 
Successes and Failures of the Striving Self 
Invoking ‘confirmation’ here returns us to the problem, though. How can this 
epistemic striving be normative? What is the relationship between specific acts of 
perception and the practical striving that underwrites their possibilities of fulfillment? In 
particular we must ask how we can understand this overarching practical intentionality as 
normatively governed such that the concept of fulfillment applies to it. After all, specific 
successes or failures of perception do not themselves seem to ratify or challenge that 
embodied practical intentionality itself. The unity of ego and expressive body is not open 
to failure or fulfilling confirmation in the same way that specific acts of perception or 
                                                 
27
 See Crowell, Steven “Husserl’s Subjectivism and the Philosophy of Mind” Normativity and 
Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger, pp. 147-165. 
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praxis are. How, then, can we understand this unity as normatively structured? What could 
it mean for the body to fail to adequately express the practical project of knowing the 
world through perception? 
As Husserl notes in Experience and Judgment, there are cases in which the 
harmony of the perceptual manifold breaks down, and the origin of negation is the 
experience of such disappointed intention, such disharmony. These disappointments can 
only occur as disappointments, however, against a background in which “…a certain 
measure of continuous fulfillment is presupposed,” (EJ 88). As we have seen, the uniform 
framework of sense that provides this background constancy of fulfillment is not only the 
object or the world but the body as the site of agency and experience in terms of which 
object and world can come to givenness. In what sense can that embodied agency itself be 
characterized by a normativity that would permit us to speak of its successes or failures 
using the language of fulfillment? 
There is a certain sense in which the ego’s body fails to be present it to: namely, as 
a perceptual object towards which one has unfulfilled intentions and unexpected 
experiences that give rise to the possibility of negation. Qua perceptual object, the body is 
characterized by incompleteness. As Husserl explicitly notes, the body is a remarkably 
poorly constituted thing (Ideas II, 159/167). But this kind of inadequacy and 
incompleteness only speaks to the body qua Körper, i.e. qua spatio-temporal object given 
to me as other spatio-temporal objects are. The kind of failure that can characterize the 
experience of the lived body expressing the ego’s agency is different in kind than that of 
other perceptual objects. When experiencing other perceptual objects, the open horizon of 
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their possible appearances cannot foreclose the possibility that they will prove to be mere 
phantasms; that the rabbit in the meadow will turn out to be a trick of the fading light. In 
the case of the lived body, however, I cannot discover that this Leib over which I am 
holding sway is not really there in the same way – the necessity and immediacy of this 
connection resists the constant possibility of skepticism that characterizes perception: “I do 
not have the possibility of distancing myself from my body” (Ideas II, 159/167). Thus 
when viewed through the lens of the naturalistic attitude, my body – my Körper – is indeed 
just another perceptual object about which I could be radically mistaken. But when seen 
through the lens of the agency that does not observe its body but lives its body as the 
terrain of its intentionality, the nature of the failure must be quite different. 
Again we must distinguish here between specific and general intentionality. 
Though I may discover that the living body is failing to adequately manifest my agency 
through particular intentions – to reach the cookies, to miss the icy patch on the ski hill –
these failings do not (for the most part) undermine the fundamental expressive unity of 
living body and animating ego. Such specific failures do not lead me to question whether I 
am embodied at all or whether this living body is the unique vehicle of my expressive ego. 
After all, the background framework of sense that is the expressive agency of ego-Leib 
unity provides the constant in terms of which I can experience the anomalous as such. It 
would only be in the most extreme cases of breakdown that this pairing relationship would 
itself fail – in death or coma or perhaps extreme cases of mental illness. In such cases, 
however, there is indeed a loss of Deckungseinheit – the ‘living body’ is no longer lived. It 
is no longer the field in which the ego finds manifestation. 
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 If this is the case, then, the way in which fulfillment functions in terms of practical 
intentionality must be understood instead as a continuum of success and failure, whereby 
the self’s embodied practices are more or less successful in manifesting its agency in the 
world. This notion of ‘more’ and ‘less’ – of degrees of fulfilled agency – is operative in 
Husserl’s discussions of the process whereby one learns to take up and master one’s 
embodiment. It is the fact that the ego-Leib unity must be learned or mastered that will 
help us explain the manner in which this fundamental unity relationship can nevertheless 
be characterized by success and failure conditions analogous to the evidence structure of 
perception. Despite the fact that we are from the beginning characterized by an intentional 
agency that is realized in the living body, we nevertheless must become habituated to it 
and are constantly responding to how this unity is a more or less successful manifestation 
of the will’s intentionality. 
 
Learning to Be Embodied 
 Husserl discusses the idea of having to take up one’s embodied condition in Ideas 
II, where he notes that the child comes to recognize the unity of its internal and external 
dimensions: 
 
[I]n the child the self-produced voice, and then, analogously, the heard voice, 
serves as the first bridge for the Objectification of the Ego…before he can 
acknowledge to the other a tactual Body and a Body incarnating the will (Ideas II, 
97/101fn). 
 
 
These different ‘dimensions’ of the body – a tactual Body and a Body incarnating the will 
– cannot be acknowledged to the other because it is precisely in such primal ‘bridging’ 
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experiences that these dimensions of oneself are first recognized as unified.28 Early on one 
must learn to see certain bodily events as the ‘external’ fulfillment of one’s intentions. One 
can note, for example, ways in which the extremely young infant – even the fetus in the 
womb – begins to engage in directed movement such as thumb-sucking. As Husserl argues 
in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, for example, a “child in its mother’s womb 
already has kinestheses and through this kinesthetic movement, its things” – as a result, the 
child at birth “is already an I with a high level of experience (since) such an experience has 
already been acquired in its intrauterine existence.”29 In such proto-instances of ‘holding 
sway’ – in which intention and fulfilling movement are first experienced as both being 
‘me’ – the child accomplishes a type of unity of self-givenness that first inaugurates it into 
the realm of intentionality and fulfillment. What begins as instinct becomes intention: the 
child learns to accomplish a coinciding unity between intention and fulfillment – the unity 
that is the condition of agency as such – through its holding sway in the responsive body. 
This is not to suggest that there is ever a stage at which there is no unity, however – 
even the most primitive, struggling forms of embodying the ‘I’ are themselves a way of 
holding sway over one’s body. In this primitive form, however, we can most clearly 
recognize the important middle ground staked out between automatic, sub-personal 
mechanisms and full-blown active, conceptual thought.30 Primal events of holding-sway 
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 Steven Crowell suggests that in this regard the infant hearing itself must be understood as a modality of 
touch. See “Husserl, Derrida, and the Phenomenology of Expression” Philosophy Today 40 (1996): 61-70, p. 
68 n.6. 
29
 Vol. III, p. 605. Quoted in Jean-Luc Petit’s “Constitution by Movement: Husserl in Light of Recent 
Neurobiological Findings” (1999) Trans. Christopher Macann. In Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in 
Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Ed. Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela, Berhard 
Pachoud and Jean-Michel Roy (Stanford: Stanford University Press) p. 223. 
30
 See Crowell 2013, p. 140-141, where he discusses the manner in which the standard of wholeness 
governing the process of perception is not conceptually but “feelingly” present to the body as such – a feeling 
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occupy this middle ground: they are normatively structured unity events that occur on the 
most basic levels of practical agency – as such, they are neither purely active nor passive, 
neither automatic nor conceptual. They are a pre-theoretical intentional struggle to respond 
appropriately to the most fundamental success and failure conditions to which the practical 
‘I’ is always attuned – success or failure at being an embodied self navigating the world 
and confirming for itself its ability to do so. Thus there is a kind of tension between the 
body and the ego that gives it purpose; the striving ego is both enabled by the body but 
also made vulnerable by its limits – a tension that sets up the understanding of fulfillment 
as a continuum encompassing degrees of self-givenness. 
Specific perceptual confirmations are therefore derivative of this overarching 
practical striving and our characterization of fulfillment must correspondingly change to 
accommodate this fact. Unlike in specific perceptual acts, the mode of confirmation 
characteristic of the latter kind of expressive unity does not provide evidence of spatio-
temporal existence. It provides, rather, confirmation of the lived body’s responsivity to the 
ego’s project of epistemic striving. The primordial meaning of fulfillment relates primarily 
to the success or failure of that practical agency, not to individual intentional acts that fall 
under the umbrella of that overarching agency. Because the ego-Leib unity is constitutive 
of this agency it cannot be adequately understood on the model of discrete intentional acts. 
Rather, it is an ongoingly present or comprehensive unity whose individual manifestations 
                                                                                                                                                    
of fit that occurs against the background of the body’s practical skills, the ‘I can’ of its embodied agency. 
Crowell goes on to suggest that Husserlian phenomenology’s emphasis on consciousness is not able to cash 
out Husserl’s own insights in this regard, and it is only later phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty and 
Heidegger who were able to transform Husserl’s conception of the transcendental subject to account for this 
primacy of caring, embodied agency (146). See the remainder of Crowell’s excellent book, Normativity and 
Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) for an 
elaboration of this view – a view which I endorse, though it should be clear from this paper that I believe this 
approach is already more fully present in Husserl than is often acknowledged. 
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serve a confirmatory or illustrative role for the overarching agency that enables and gives 
meaning to those individual manifestations. An agency, further, that need not be 
understood as an all or nothing state, but a continuum of confirmation that we are aware of 
as such because of a.) our past and current struggles for a mastery that better expresses that 
agency, and b.) breakdown conditions such as illness that remind us of the ways in which 
that agency can be both enabled and thwarted by the body in which it finds expression. 
 
Temporality 
At this point one might be tempted to object that I have overlooked the mode of 
fulfillment operative in temporality. After all, isn’t the most primordial form of 
experienced unity not that of the ego-expressing lived body but the temporal flow of 
consciousness itself, constantly confirmed by the transition of protentions into the living 
now? Why isn’t the pure I of temporality sufficient for understanding fulfilled self-
identification? Throughout his work, Husserl emphasizes the essential unifying role of the 
temporal stream and the fact that it occurs on a more fundamental level than even 
embodied holding-sway. Should we not take the fulfillment of protentions to be the most 
foundational sense of fulfillment event, then – more primordial than both perceptual and 
ego-Leib fulfillment? Husserl claims, for example that “protention, unlike retention, is 
essentially a meaning-intention” (PAS 86/129). When we look to the temporal structure 
underwriting perception, we see that perception “harbors, at every moment, the 
anticipatory certainty of what is to come, the certainty of its futural occurrence (and it does 
this completely without our help)” (PAS, 87/131). Further, he suggests that we cannot even 
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imagine consciousness without the lawful nexus of temporal unfolding – an unfolding in 
which we are constantly expecting and being confirmed in our expectations of an arriving 
future. 
 The nature of this kind of ‘fulfillment’ is of a radically different kind, however, 
than the perceptual or ego-Leib confirmation events that we have been discussing. The 
reason for this is that the temporal flow occurs on such a level of pre-personal passivity 
that describing our relationship to the advent of the future as ‘expectation’ or ‘anticipation’ 
is already too active – the future comes, no matter what our stance toward it. To 
characterize our relationship to its arrival as a confirmation or as an event of intention-
fulfillment, then, is misleading. Rather, the dimensions of temporal streaming occur on a 
level prior to even the most basic modes of intentionality: 
Since we are certain from the outset that something is going to arrive in the living 
perception, there is no room at all for a wishing that it should be, or even for a 
willing that it should become by realizing it in our actions (PAS, 87/131). 
 
This must be the case, since the streaming unity of temporality is the most basic condition 
for the unity of experience. Without this flowing unity – its character of ongoing becoming 
– consciousness itself would be impossible. The consequence is that the unity of 
temporality cannot be experienced as a normative continuum – there is no sense in which 
the arrival of the future comes in degrees or involves the possibility of an experienced lack 
of confirmation. Indeed, though Husserl characterizes the living-present in terms of 
“temporal flow,” he nevertheless admits to using the term metaphorically, since it itself is 
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not characterized by succession or any of the predicates that characterize objects or 
processes within time.31 
Further, this kind of constantly renewed unity of the streaming present is also, in a 
sense, empty – we can only speak of these temporal structures in terms of the content that 
fills them and allows us to recognize protention, retention and present as such: 
 
[W]hat makes division possible and the relation between parts in consciousness, 
and so forth – the analysis of time alone cannot tell us, for it abstracts precisely 
from content. Thus it does not give us any idea of the necessary synthetic structures 
of the streaming present and the unitary stream of the presents – which in some 
way concerns the particularity of content” (PAS, 129/174). 
 
 
As soon as we begin to speak of the content of internal time consciousness, then, we are 
returned to the embodied I, to which all content irrevocably refers: 
I assert that our given consciousness and its given type and its essential type has 
this marvelous feature, not only to constitute objectively (in the sense of 
demonstrated absolute necessity) its own temporal being with respect to the past up 
to the present, but also its future. If we ask, however, how our streaming 
consciousness brings that about, our answer runs: through the fact that it constitutes 
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 See Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, No. 54, 370-1/381-2 
(trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). The manner in which this 
bedrock of internal time – along with the ‘Langsintentionalität’ through which it is given and the problem of 
infinite regress that threatens it – is a matter of much debate. Commenters agree, however, that such self-
presence cannot (easily) be understood in terms of intentionality (and corresponding fulfilment experiences). 
For example, Toine Kortooms suggests in Phenomenology of Time: Edmund Husserl’s Analysis of Time-
Consciousness that “Husserl develops a radical notion of the passivity of pre-consciousness in which the 
syntheses occur that lead to the formation of primally associative, pre-temporal unities. In order to 
underscore the radical character of this notion, Husserl no longer wishes to speak about an intentionality 
here, even if it were to be a non-egoic intentionality (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, p. 286). 
As Luis Niel puts it: “It should be clear by now that ‘stream-intentionality’ can only be called ‘intentionality’ 
in a sense analogical to that of act-intentionality, since by the former we do not find any accomplishment of 
an act nor anything like an objective correlate of intentionality” (“The Phenomenology of Primal-
Phenomenality: Husserl and the Boundaries of the Phenomenology of Time” Husserl Studies 29 (2013): 211-
230, p. 216-217). See also Brough, John. “The Most Difficult of All Phenomenological Problems” Husserl 
Studies 27 (2011): 27-40; Hoerl, Christoph. “Husserl, the Temporal Flow, and Temporal Experience” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2013): 376-411; Zahavi, Dan. “Time and Consciousness in 
the Bernau Manuscripts” Husserl Studies 20 (2004): 99-118; Zahavi, Dan. “Inner Time Consciousness and 
Pre-reflective Self-awareness” in The New Husserl (ed. Donn Welton. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2003, pp. 157-180).  
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within itself an objective world in a transcendent intentionality. A stream of lived-
experiences of spatio-material existence runs throughout the stream of the lived-
experiences such that all things experienced in the course of the steady sequence of 
perception are referred to one’s own lived-body with which everything else that 
emerges in the course of lived-experience under the rubric of psychical lived-
experiences is then constituted as intertwined in a regulated manner (PAS, 
213/265). 
 
The continuity of temporal experience cannot be legitimately characterized as instances of 
fulfillment, then, since it occurs on a constitutive level prior to intentionality and its 
objects.32 
Indeed, the immediacy and primordiality of the embodiment relationship might 
lead us to question whether the ‘spatiality’ of embodied expression is equiprimordial with 
the temporal unity that Husserl takes to characterize consciousness on its most basic level.  
Husserl himself seems to consider this when he notes that: 
Thus, miraculously a perceptual object that we call one’s own lived body is 
distinctive in such a way that with each perception of an object, whatever it may be, 
the lived-body is always there and always co-constituted. And this object is entirely 
unique by virtue of the fact that it always ‘bears within it’ the zero-point, the 
absolute Here, in relation to which every other object is a There. Just as universal, 
unending time is constantly and inexorably referred to the absolute Now, so too is 
the entire unending space inexorably referred to the absolute Here and to the 
coordinates of orientation attached to it (PAS, 584/298). 
  
Insofar as experience refers merely to that which is passive and pre-personal it is temporal 
in form; but if we are to speak of consciousness in terms of intentional encounters with 
objects that can succeed or fail at fulfilling these intentions we are irrevocably returned to 
                                                 
32As Niel points out, this raises many problems for the analysis of this most basic stratum of time 
consciousness, “since in our experience we are always dealing with temporal experiences and not with the 
flow itself. Thus we can only outline what this flow is by contrasting it with what it is not, i.e., constituted 
unities in time (whether subjective or objective). Thus, according to Husserl, ‘[t]he flow is something we 
speak of in conformity with what is constituted’ (CW IV, p. 79, Hua X, p. 75)” (Niel 2013, 215).  
 41
the manner in which consciousness individuates itself spatially through the orientations 
and activities of the living body. 
Indeed, Husserl seems to tentatively consider what I take to be the crucial point: 
namely, even ‘pure’ inner consciousness – the absolute meaning field of the transcendental 
Ego – cannot escape understanding itself in terms of primal spatial concepts of location, 
orientation, direction, etc. because the ‘pure Ego’ cannot but rely on the unacknowledged 
models and standards derived from the nature of its embodied agency33: 
The structure of the acts which radiate out from the Ego-Center, or the Ego itself, is 
a form which has an analogon in the centralizing of all sense-phenomena in 
reference to the Body. In absolute consciousness there is always a ‘field’ of 
intentionality, and the spiritual ‘focus’ of the attention ‘directs’ itself now onto this, 
now onto that. The question is whether these images have an original meaning and 
are expressing a primordial analogy. That is to say, does there lie in the act of 
attention, abstraction made from the spatial, whence the image is derived, 
something like a directing that emanates from a point? (Ideas II, 105-106/112). 
 
If we recognize the deep role that spatiality plays in the structure of consciousness, then, it 
is easy to see how the experience of fulfilled intention accomplished in the body’s 
expression of the ego’s holding sway is a type of ‘primal instituting’ of the meaning of 
fulfilled intention. It serves, so to speak, as a ‘primordial analogy’ in terms of which 
higher-order fulfillment events are recognized. Such primal experiences are exemplars 
insofar as they are concrete yet normative experiences: they are livingly present to all 
embodied knowers as fulfillment events in terms of which other fulfillment experiences are 
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 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s book The Roots of Thinking (1990) (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1990) offers a more thorough examination of this general approach by using genetic phenomenology together 
with paleoanthropology to demonstrate the ways in which meanings originate in primordial experiences of 
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What was – and is – originally thought was – and is – founded on a bodily logos” (7-8). In The Body in the 
Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason, Mark Johnston similarly argues that 
embodiment is indispensable for meaning, since it provides imaginative schemas in terms of which 
rationality and understanding function. For example, the way in which we intertwine the senses of 'more' and 
‘up' is founded on a 'verticality schema' rooted in the body (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, xv). 
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understood as such. All intention-fulfillment experiences that involve higher-level 
objectivities involve a reference back to this basic meaning of fulfillment as agency 
realizing itself in the world. Characterizing the body as the first ‘object’ is misleading, 
then, since embodied expressions of will are the founding events of intention-fulfillment in 
terms of which the orientation toward ‘objects’ becomes possible at all – including 
perceptual objects and those objects so foundational for constituting objectivity: the lived 
bodies of others. 
 
The Community of Embodied Knowers  
As Husserl’s account of the sciences makes clear, scientific objectivity relies on our 
ability to activate in others the same primordial experiences of self-givenness that we 
ourselves have had. Thus Husserl notes in “The Origin of Geometry” that scientific 
propositions persist as an ideal across time precisely because they rely on our “capacity for 
translating these sentences from vague linguistic understanding into the clarity of the 
reactivation of their self-evident meaning.”34 Science’s claims, he continues, “can be 
justified as an expression of the alleged truth-meaning only through the actual capacity for 
reactivation” (Crisis, 368). This ‘capacity for reactivation’ – i.e. for shared verification 
through multiple first-person graspings of the givenness of a particular meaning – is 
presupposed in the idea of phenomenology as a science – especially as a descriptive 
science. The primary sense of description, Husserl notes, is “gifted in provoking intuition” 
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 Crisis 366, Appendix VI: “The Origin of Geometry.” 
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(Ideas II, 372/382, supplements) – in other words, gifted in activating in others the 
immediacy of experiences of self-givenness.35 
Phenomenology, then, if it is to be a science as Husserl conceives of science, is not 
only about seeing, but about both seeing and communicating together. The 
communication of phenomenological insights through description are indispensable 
to the practice of Husserlian phenomenology (Koukal 2001, 24). 
 
It is not enough for a phenomenologist to uncover the structures of first-person 
consciousness for herself – rather, like all sciences, phenomenology is committed to the 
idea that such first-person experiences can be confirmed by others who can also be brought 
to have them. Thus phenomenology includes an irrevocably discursive and rhetorical 
moment – its descriptive flourishes are not accidental but central to the project of bringing 
the other knower into a first-person grasping of the thing itself.36 
What is of particular interest for us here is the extent to which Husserl uses 
metaphors of embodiment when speaking of phenomenology’s capacity to do so in the 
case of fulfillment. He frequently describes an experience of fulfilled intention in terms of 
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‘bodily presence.’37 The fulfilling intuition is leibhaft – a descriptive choice that is not 
accidental but essential for phenomenology’s ability to serve as a descriptive science of the 
most fundamental dimensions of consciousness. In other words, Husserl speaks of 
something as ‘self-evident’ insofar as the presence of an object or context of meaning is as 
undeniably and immediately real as one’s own living body – an experience of immediate 
and unquestionable self-givenness that Husserl can rely on every reader to recognize. It is, 
after all, the ‘primordial analogy’ by which we can make the deepest structures of 
consciousness understandable. 
Though Husserl does not explicitly articulate the role that this primal ego-Leib 
relationship plays in the meaning of fulfillment – and perhaps did not fully recognize it 
himself – its presence is clear. Effective description is capable of evoking a corresponding 
sense of self-evidence in other members of the phenomenological community and when 
faced with describing the most basic meaning of fulfillment, Husserl turns again and again 
to metaphors that express the fundamental sense of fulfilled intention in terms of embodied 
agency – an experience that is common to all embodied knowers. His use of terms like ‘in 
person,’ ‘in the flesh,’ ‘seeing’ or ‘grasping’ to explain the relationship of intention-
fulfillment is therefore a revealing expression of the foundational nature of this 
relationship, betraying the role that the experience of embodied agency plays in 
constituting what meaning-fulfillment means. Indeed, even when he is expressing the 
‘principle of all principles’ he claims that we are to accept “everything originarily (so to 
speak, in its ‘personal’ actuality)” (Ideas I, §24, 43/44). Since the intuition Husserl is 
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 See, for example, section §136 of Ideas I, where he repeatedly talks about fulfillment in terms of being 
there ‘in person.’  
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seeking to provoke there is the meaning of intention-fulfillment itself, what better way to 
do so than by pointing to the primal experience of such intention-fulfillment – the 
expressive unity of embodied agency – which is the very foundation of that meaning? 
Much more needs to be said about the extent to which Husserl himself was aware 
of this shift toward a practical foundation for the meaning of fulfillment, in addition to the 
ways in which this Husserlian interpretation compares to variations on this theme in 
thinkers like Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. What I hope to have done here, however, is 
simply call into question the dominant narrative whereby the meaning of fulfillment is 
simply taken to be founded upon isolated acts of perception. 
